---
title: "secret-guard"
url: "https://claudemods.dev/zh-cn/builds/secret-guard-80ba09"
source: "https://github.com/ShriD5/claude-mods/tree/main/secret-guard"
source_type: "github"
repo: "https://github.com/ShriD5/claude-mods/tree/main/secret-guard"
author: "ShriD5"
author_handle: "ShriD5"
stars: 2
category: "安全与隐私"
categories: ["security"]
tags: ["credential-detection", "hooks", "plugin", "secrets", "security"]
permission_level: 2
scan_complete: true
install: "claude plugin marketplace add ShriD5/claude-mods\nclaude plugin install secret-guard"
added: "2026-10-05T01:59:37.153Z"
updated: "2026-10-04T18:19:52Z"
locale: "zh-cn"
content_locale: "zh-cn"
---

# secret-guard

通过 tool.call 钩子阻止 Write、Edit、MultiEdit、NotebookEdit 和 Bash 重定向把看似真实的凭据写入文件，同时允许占位符、开发默认值和 .env 文件。

## Description

secret-guard 添加 tool.call 钩子，检查文件工具准备写入的文本以及 Bash 命令重定向到文件的内容；发现看似真实的凭据就拒绝调用。它检测 AWS、Anthropic/OpenAI、GitHub、Slack、Stripe、Google 密钥、私钥块以及带内嵌密码的数据库 URL。占位符（xxxx、process.env.X、EXAMPLE 密钥）、开发默认值（localhost、example.com、postgres:postgres）、文件中已有的秘密和 .env 系列文件会放行，但 .env.example/.sample/.template 仍受保护。CLAUDE.md 和 AGENTS.md 会接受更严格检查。被阻止时会告诉 Claude 发现了什么及所在行，并要求改用环境变量，不回显秘密。使用 claude --plugin-dir ./secret-guard 或市集安装，并运行 /secret-guard 查看按类型统计的阻止结果。

## Install

```
claude plugin marketplace add ShriD5/claude-mods
claude plugin install secret-guard
```

## Original README

# secret-guard

Stops Claude from writing secrets into files. When a Write, Edit, MultiEdit or NotebookEdit would put a real-looking credential into a file, or a Bash command would `echo`, `printf`, `tee` or heredoc one into a file, the call is refused. Claude is told what it found and on which line, and to read the value from an environment variable instead, with the value kept in a gitignored `.env`. The secret itself is never repeated back.

```
🔒 secret-guard blocked a GitHub token in config.ts
```

It catches:

- AWS access keys (`AKIA…`, `ASIA…`)
- Anthropic keys (`sk-ant-…`), OpenAI keys (`sk-proj-…`, legacy `sk-…`), and other long `sk-…` keys
- GitHub tokens (`ghp_`, `gho_`, `ghu_`, `ghs_`, `ghr_`, `github_pat_`)
- Slack tokens (`xoxb-`, `xoxp-`, …) and Slack webhook URLs
- Stripe live keys (`sk_live_`, `rk_live_`)
- Google API keys (`AIza…`)
- private key blocks (`-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----` with a key body)
- database URLs with an inline password (`postgres://`, `mysql://`, `mongodb+srv://`, `redis://`, `amqp://`)

It lets these through:

- **Placeholders**: `xxxx`, `your-key-here`, `<api-key>`, `${VAR}`, `process.env.X`, `AKIA…EXAMPLE`, low-variety strings.
- **Dev defaults**: database URLs to `localhost` or a docker service name, documentation hosts like `example.com`, and default passwords like `postgres:postgres`.
- **Secrets the file already holds**: editing next to an existing key isn't blocked.
- **Env files**: `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production` and `.dev.vars`, which is where the deny message tells Claude to put secrets. `.env.example`, `.env.sample` and `.env.template` are still guarded, because those get committed.

**CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md get extra-strict checks.** In those files any credential-named assignment with a random-looking value (`api_key: "q8Zr…"`) is blocked too. The deny reason also tells Claude why: these files are often committed and public, and in a public sample of 25,784 CLAUDE.md files, 275 contained real-looking secrets.

Run `/secret-guard` to see how many secrets it has blocked so far, broken down by type.

## Install

```sh
claude --plugin-dir ./secret-guard
```

or add this repo as a marketplace and install it with `/plugin`.

## Options

None. The rules live in `hooks/detect.ts`. Each one is a regex for a format a real service issues, followed by placeholder checks.

## How it works

A `tool.call` hook reads the text a file tool is about to write, or the files a Bash command redirects into, and runs the detector on it. If anything new turns up, it answers `{ deny }` so the tool never runs. The running count is kept in `$.store`.
